U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: An Economic Approach to Cyberlaundering by Turner, Shawn
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 4
2004
U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: An
Economic Approach to Cyberlaundering
Shawn Turner
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Shawn Turner, U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: An Economic Approach to Cyberlaundering, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1389
(2004)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol54/iss4/15
U.S. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
REGULATIONS:
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
CYBERLAUNDERING
It is my belief that economists, and policymakers generally,
have tended to over-estimate the advantages which come
from governmental regulation. But this belief, even if justi-
fied, does not do more than suggest that governmental regu-
lation should be curtailed. It does not tell us where the
boundary line should be drawn. This, it seems to me, has to
come from a detailed investigation of the actual results of
handling the problem in different ways. But it would be un-
fortunate if this investigation were undertaken with the aid of
a faulty economic analysis. The aim of this article is to indi-
cate what the economic approach to the problem should be.1
The International Monetary Fund estimates that at least $600
billion is laundered annually, representing between two and five
percent of the world's gross domestic product.2 While "primarily
a paperless crime, without physical violence directed at individu-
als," money laundering can have a widespread detrimental impact
on a nation's economy.3
Laundering undermines and manipulates legitimate busi-
nesses by allowing considerations other than sound business
practice to influence decisions. It corrupts public officials,
perhaps even entire governments, by buying votes and influ-
encing the actions of politicians and career officials. It dis-
I RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 119 (1988).
2 147 CONG. REC. H7159 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001). But see GUY STESSENS, MONEY
LAUNDERING: A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MODEL 89 (2000) (asserting the
"impossibility" of accurately estimating the amount of money laundered).
3 Madelyn J. Daley, Effectiveness of United States and International Efforts to Combat
International Money Laundering, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 175, 179
(2000) (suggesting money laundering "is a grave crime due to its impact on the nation's econ-
omy").
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torts macroeconomic estimates, skews currency markets, and
destabilizes financial institutions through the creation of ille-
gal economies.
Money laundering may even destabilize the global economy.5
While the foregoing comments reflect strong criticisms of money
laundering, one commentator suggests that efforts to prevent
money laundering "all have in common that they view money
laundering not as a reprehensible activity in itself, but as part of a
larger criminal activity which is harmful to society."6
While money laundering is not new,7 its importance in sup-
porting criminal enterprises recently recaptured the attention of
both politicians and the general population. As the intricate, well-
planned terrorist scheme that culminated in the September 11,
2001, attacks is publicly unraveled, we are reminded just how per-
vasive money laundering is in criminal activities ranging from
drug smuggling to acts intended to inflict mass casualties. Even
though money laundering typically does not entail physical vio-
lence directed at people, the activities money laundering supports
certainly threaten society in general. For instance, Treasury De-
partment analysts estimate that a single global money laundering
network channeled as much as $15 million to $20 million per year
to the Al Qaeda organization responsible for carrying out the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, attacks on New York City, Washington, D.C.,
and Pennsylvania. 8 Recognizing the potential social and economic
impacts associated with widespread money laundering, the United
States relies on regulations, international cooperation, criminal
sanctions, and forfeiture to combat money laundering. 9
In this age of globalization, liberalized capital markets and
technological advances have done more than reduce legitimate
business transaction costs; criminal transaction costs have also
4 Ronald K. Noble & Court E. Golumbic, A New Anti-Crime Framework for the World:
Merging the Objective and Subjective Models for Fighting Money Laundering, 30 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 79, 90-91 (1998).
5 Todd Doyle, Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current FATF Tactics
Needlessly Violate International Law, 24 Hous. J. INT'L L. 279, 285 (2002) (asserting that
"money laundering destabilizes the global economy").
6 STESSENS, supra note 2, at 85-86.
7 Daley, supra note 3, at 179 (claiming the term "'money laundering' was first used in
the United States to label the Mafia's blending of illegal income with legitimate business reve-
nue," but has since been employed expansively).
8 See The Financial War on Terrorism and the Administration's Implementation of the
Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act: Hearings Before the S. Banking
Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary, Department of
the Treasury), available at 2002 WL 110357.
9 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE USA PATRIOT Acr: A LEGAL ANALYSIS CRS-24
(2002).
[Vol. 54:4
U.S. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS
been reduced. One commentator argues that the "internationalisa-
tion of crime [is a] mere illegal spin-off of the globalisation of the
legal economy."10 Some authors argue that because money laun-
dering has blossomed into a widespread international phenomenon,
efforts to curtail money laundering must focus on building broad
international anti-money laundering standards in order to avoid a
"race to the bottom" wherein nations will offer lax money launder-
ing regulations in order to attract industry and the associated tax
revenues and job creation."
This Note argues that the United States is taking the correct
economic approach to solving the money laundering problem. Af-
ter introducing money laundering in Part I, this Note, in Part II,
will suggest that a race-to-the-bottom analysis may not be appro-
priate in the money-laundering arena. Money laundering creates
negative externalities, rather than the problematic market competi-
tion described in a race-to-the-bottom scenario. Recognizing
money laundering as an externalities issue has important implica-
tions for choosing the appropriate anti-money laundering regula-
tory scheme. As a result, Part III will examine U.S. anti-money
laundering efforts, both internationally and domestically, and will
argue that those efforts appropriately address money laundering
externalities issues in general. Part IV will examine how new anti-
money laundering efforts can be used to combat developing money
laundering technologies and will argue that the current regulations
provide the tools necessary to address internet-based money laun-
dering risks.
I. MoNEY LAUNDERING: WHAT IS IT AND
How Is IT ACCOMPLISHED?
Laundered money is the fertilizer that nourishes criminal ac-
tivity. Money laundering has been defined as "the process by
which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal applica-
tion of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear
legitimate." 12 One author suggests, "Money laundering operations
generally boil down to 'a ... complex process often using the lat-
est technology, of sanitising money in such a manner that its true
nature, source or use is concealed, thereby creating an apparent
10 STESSENS, supra note 2, at 90.
1 Herbert V. Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs. Sov-
ereignty, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 779, 790-91 (2002) (arguing that the race to the bottom is "highly
undesirable because.., such a practice can cause severe damage to the economy").
12 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984).
2004]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
justification for controlling or possessing the laundered money."' 3
Dirty money is typically laundered in three steps: (1) placing
money derived from criminal activities into a legitimate enterprise;
(2) layering the money through multiple transactions to "obscure
the original source"; and (3) integrating the clean funds into the
"legitimate financial world 'in the form of bank notes, loans, let-
ters of credit,' or other recognizable financial instruments."'
' 4
Placement is the first stage in a money-laundering scheme. In
this stage, the money must be transformed into a "flexible and le-
gitimate form" and placed into a financial institution.15 Since anti-
money laundering statutes impose reporting requirements on banks
for certain transactions, 6 launderers will typically channel funds
through "front operations" like restaurants as a method to legiti-
mize the funds. 17 Alternatively, launderers can turn cash into other
negotiable instruments like cashier's checks, money orders, or
traveler's checks, which are less burdensome to smuggle and less
likely to trigger reporting requirements when deposited into finan-
cial institutions.' 8  Perhaps most challenging to detect is the
placement that occurs in nontraditional financial institutions such
as "informal banking systems" and casinos.' 9
Layering is the second stage in the typical money-laundering
scheme. During this stage, launderers have a range of options.
Launderers transfer funds through various accounts, often using
wire transfers in offshore accounts located in the Cayman Islands,
Panama, and the Bahamas. 20 The faster the wire transfers are car-
ried out, the more difficult tracing the transactions becomes. 21 In-
ternational trade transactions also represent an extremely problem-
atic form of layering.22 In this scheme, launderers use legitimate
import-export businesses to over-invoice goods sold by a laun-
13 STESSENS, supra note 2, at 83 (citation omitted).
14 Money Laundering, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 839, 840 (2002).
15 Daley, supra note 3, at 177.
16 See infra Part 111.
'7 See Daley, supra note 3, at 177-78.
18 Id. at 178.
19 Andres Rueda, International Money Laundering Law Enforcement and the USA PA-
TRIOT Act of 2001, 10 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 141, 175-76 (2001) (reporting that U.S. compa-
nies such as General Electric, Microsoft, Apple Computers, and General Motors have been used
as money laundering facilities for Colombian drug traffickers through the "peso exchange").
20 Id. at 178.
21 Id. at 177 (suggesting the layering stage is "facilitated by the speed at which wire trans-
fers can be performed between widely different jurisdictions, resulting in a web of transactions
almost impossible to trace").
22 Id. at 178 (noting that "criminals and tax evaders have increasingly come to realize that
money laundering through international trade is almost undetectable" because "[liaw enforce-
ment officials simply lack the capacity to analyze every single international trade transaction in
the U.S.").
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derer's front company or a legitimate offshore company. 23  An-
other layering scheme is carried out through commodity and fu-
tures brokerages wherein brokers do not trade in their clients'
names, thereby enabling the client to "buy and sell the same com-
modity, paying any trading losses with dirty money, and receiving
in exchange a check legitimized as trading profits. 24
Integration is the final stage in a typical money-laundering
scheme. Once reintroduced into the "legitimate economy," the
dirty funds are fully laundered.25  Money launders can use legiti-
mate bankers, lawyers, or other fiduciaries as integration vehi-
cles.26 Launderers also use debit or credit cards issued through
offshore banks, fake loans from offshore companies, and real es-
tate "flips., 27  Once filtered through these three cycles, the laun-
dered money is ready to be used to nurture and support future
criminal activity.
II. EXTERNALITIES: THE MAJOR ISSUE IN
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION
The manner in which regulators view the ills that flow from
money laundering has significant policy and regulatory implica-
tions, both domestically and internationally. Some authors suggest
global anti-money laundering standards are required to prevent a
race to the bottom wherein nations will offer lax money-laundering
regulations in order to attract industry and the associated tax reve-
nues and job creation. 28 However, why such a "race" will occur is
not readily apparent. In fact, a race-to-the-bottom analysis may
not be the appropriate framework for examining anti-money laun-
dering regulations. 29 Drawing on debate among environmental
23 Id. (commenting that examples of such transactions include importing safety razor
blades "from Singapore for $2,952 each; apple juice from Israel for $2,052 per liter; flashlight
lamps from Taiwan for $3,875.00; and missile/rocket launchers exported to Venezuela for
$59.50 each").
24 Id. at 179.
25 Daley, supra note 3, at 178.
26 Rueda, supra note 19, at 179 (suggesting that "even after performing exhaustive due
diligence," these individuals would not recognize the funds as laundered criminal proceeds).
27 Id. at 179-80 (describing real estate "flips").
28 Morais, supra note 11, at 790-91 (arguing that absent "sound and widely-accepted in-
ternational standards ... some countries [are] prepared and willing to offer lax legal and regula-
tory regimes as a way of attracting and keeping foreign investment," and that this kind of "regu-
latory arbitrage... [is] sometimes referred to as a race to the bottom"); see also Ayman Riz-
kalla, Money Laundering: The European Approach, 13 TUL. EUR. & CIv. L.F. 111, 123 (1998)
(arguing that the European Community's requirement that new members align anti-money laun-
dering regulations with the Community's before a new member will be considered for member-
ship is "vital because any other policy would create 'a race to the bottom"').
29 See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-
the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1252-
53 (1992) (arguing that theorists inconsistently apply race to the bottom to distinct scenarios,
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regulation scholars, this section will describe the circumstances in
which a race to the bottom occurs, and will compare this scenario
with an alternative scenario based on negative externalities. 30 This
section will argue that social costs associated with money launder-
ing stem from circumstances more similar to negative externalities
than to the race-to-the-bottom scenario.
This section will suggest that the policy implications emanat-
ing from viewing the money laundering phenomenon as producing
externalities rather than a race to the bottom. Finally, this section
will argue that this externalities-based analysis justifies stringent,
broadly applied domestic anti-money laundering regulation and
unilateral efforts to coerce other nations to improve loose anti-
money laundering standards. While this Note will not advocate
completely abandoning efforts to create international standards,
this Note will suggest that such efforts may actually increase costs
already borne by compliant nations, rather than redirecting those
costs to noncompliant nations, perpetrators, and industries most
susceptible to money laundering.
A. The Race-to-the-Bottom Debate in Environmental Policy
The fundamental concept of "externality" must be addressed
before describing a race to the bottom. According to Ronald
Coase, the economist Paul Samuelson coined the term "external-
ity" sometime in the 1950s to describe situations in which an "'in-
dividual's actions have effects on others which he does not take
into account in making his decisions."' 3' One writer defined "ex-
ternality" as "an effect of one agent's actions on the welfare of
another., 32 Coase himself felt the term "externality" was "unnec-
essary" and preferred to rely on the phrase "harmful effects. 33
Regardless, for simplicity's sake, this Note will use the term "ex-
ternality."
including defects in interstate competitive processes, divergent interests over location decisions
among principals and agents, and interstate externalities).
30 See infra Part U.A (explaining "externalities").
31 COASE, supra note 1, at 23.
32 Id. at 23-24 (quoting Frank A. Hahn, Reflections on the Invisible Hand, LLOYDS BANK
REV. 7-8 (April 1982)).
33 Id. at 27 ("Indeed, one of my aims ... was to show that such 'harmful effects' could be
treated like any other factor of production... and that it was unnecessary to use a concept such
as 'externality' . . . I was clearly unsuccessful in cutting my argument loose from the dominant
approach.").
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1. Single Jurisdiction Scenario
Professor Revesz elaborately described the elements of a race
to the bottom in the environmental context. 34 Assume jurisdiction
A exists and is unaffected by events taking place outside its
boundaries. 35  Absent regulation, any firm in jurisdiction A will
produce a level of pollution that will maximize profits.36 Unless
the pollution adversely affects the firm, the firm will not consider
the adverse health effects that jurisdiction A's citizens suffer from
the pollution.37 Thus, the pollution becomes an externality and the
firm's realized costs will be lower than its actual production
costs. 38 As a result, the firm will produce more output (and, con-
sequently, more pollution) than it would produce if forced to inter-
nalize the pollution CoStS.39  In this scenario, any regulation en-
acted to achieve the "socially optimal level of pollution" must
"force polluters to internalize the costs that they impose on breath-
ers.
,4o
2. Competitive Jurisdictions Scenario
The race-to-the-bottom theory is based on several assump-
tions. First, assume that jurisdiction A competes with jurisdiction
B and that actions in one jurisdiction affect the other jurisdiction.41
Next, assume pollution is contained in the jurisdiction in which it
is produced, and that the total number of firms in both jurisdictions
is fixed (i.e., firms can move jurisdictions, but firms cannot enter
or exit the market).42 Remember, firms are still profit-maximizers
and, as such, will want to minimize the costs associated with pol-
lution control.43  As a result, firms will migrate to the jurisdiction
with the least stringent pollution requirements so long as moving
34 Revesz, supra note 29; see also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws,
International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1872-
74 (1997) (describing the race to the bottom in the capital markets and securities industry);
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Imple-
mentation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) (describing the
circumstances surrounding a race to the bottom).
35 Revesz, supra note 29, at 1213.
36 Id. at 1213-14.
37 Id. (arguing that adverse health effects are "externalities" or "social costs").
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. (arguing that economic theory suggests "that the socially optimal level of pollution
reduction is the level that maximizes the benefits that accrue from such reduction to the indi-
viduals who breathe the polluted air, minus the costs of pollution control"). Revesz notes that
this theory assumes bargaining transaction costs between the polluters and breathers is high
enough to "preclude bargaining from yielding the socially optimal outcome." Id. at 1214 n.6.
41 See id. at 1213-14
42 Id. at 1214 (assuming "there are no interjurisdictional pollution externalities").
43 See id.
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to the new jurisdiction costs less than complying with environ-
mental standards in the current jurisdiction. Third, assume that
each jurisdiction has the same preference for pollution.45
In the competitive situation, regulators will set pollution stan-
dards at a level where the marginal benefit citizens enjoy for the
given air quality is equivalent to the marginal compliance cost im-
posed on polluters.46 However, regulators will also have to con-
sider other factors because attracting new firms will bring new
jobs resulting in increased wages and taxes-benefits to the juris-
diction.47 In the end, regulators in these competitive jurisdictions
will be forced to consider the benefits (an enlarged industrial base)
resulting from less stringent environmental standards, and the
costs (reduced industrial base) that may occur from more stringent
standards.aS
Assuming the total number of firms in both jurisdictions is
fixed, when jurisdiction A reduces pollution standards, jurisdiction
A encourages industrial immigration and will reap the benefits
from additional industrial activity.49 Jurisdiction B ultimately
loses industry and the taxes and wages associated therewith.5
Consequently, jurisdiction B, in turn, will relax its standards to
regain the lost industry. 51 While either jurisdiction, acting indi-
vidually, might decline to adopt high environmental standards that
might lead to capital emigration to jurisdictions with lower stan-
dards, as the previous assumption mandates, both jurisdictions
have the same preference for pollution and will adopt lower stan-
dards than they otherwise would prefer.52
In the end, the readjustments between jurisdictional standards
will reach equilibrium at which point the moving costs firms face
will be greater than the compliance costs; therefore, neither juris-
4 See id.
45 Stewart, supra note 34, at 1212.
46 See Revesz, supra note 29, at 1215. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF AM. Bus., TIME FOR THE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ARISTOCRACY TO GIVE UP
POWER 9 (1998) (agreeing with Revesz); Wallace E. Oates, Thinking About Environmental
Federalism, RESOURCES, Winter 1998, at 14 ("[T]he central idea emerging from the literature in
public economics is that the responsibility for providing a particular public service should be
assigned to the smallest jurisdiction whose geographical scope encompasses the relevant bene-
fits and costs associated with the provision of the service.").
47 Revesz, supra note 29, at 1215.
48 See id.
49 Id.
50 See id.
51 See id. at 1216.
52 Stewart, supra note 34, at 1212 (arguing that the mobility of industry poses a risk for
any individual state or community that decides unilaterally to adopt high environmental stan-
dards; communities may reasonably "fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more
than offset by movement of capital to other areas with lower standards").
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diction has an incentive to change its standards. This race to the
bottom results in both jurisdictions having equally permissive
standards, and because industry will no longer flow between the
jurisdictions, each jurisdiction will have the "same level of indus-
trial activity that it would have had as an island jurisdiction. 54
Overall pollution will increase and social welfare in each jurisdic-
tion will be lower than the single island jurisdiction because the
competitive jurisdictions will have adopted "suboptimally lax
standards"-the ultimate race to the bottom.55 The result is a de-
fective "interstate competitive process" because, in the end, neither
jurisdiction gains taxes or wage benefits, but each state has more
pollution.56
Race-to-the-bottom theorists rely on this defective competi-
tive process to justify federal government intervention. Based on
the assumptions set forth above, and the reasoning following
thereafter, race-to-the-bottom theorists argue that jurisdictions will
compete for industry through establishing lower environmental
standards than they would otherwise set "if there were some bind-
ing mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to enact higher
standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or de-
velopment. 57 In other words, if the federal government steps in
and mandates environmental standards, all the states will enact
stringent environmental standards.
B. Defeating the Assumptions in the Money-Laundering Context
1. Lax Anti-Money Laundering Regulations Spawn Interjurisdictional
Externalities
The circumstances surrounding money laundering defeat all
the assumptions upon which the race-to-the-bottom theory is
based. As already described, race-to-the-bottom theorists assume
that pollution remains in the jurisdiction in which it is produced.
Consequently, competition between the jurisdictions ensues, re-
sulting in suboptimal standards, even in the "absence of interstate
pollution externalities. 58 This assumption does not hold in the
international money laundering situation.59 It is abundantly clear
53 Revesz, supra note 29, at 1216.
4 Id.
55 Id. (labeling this phenomena as the paradigmatic race to the bottom).
56 Id. at 1252.
57 Stewart, supra note 34, at 1212.
58 Revesz, supra note 29, at 1252.
59 Choi & Guzman, supra note 34, at 1874 (arguing that the race-to-the-bottom paradigm
is "too simplistic for the international context").
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that "pollution" in the form of laundered money travels across po-
litical borders because individuals seeking to launder dirty money
logically will introduce the money into an economy that presents
the lowest detection risk.6 ° Once the money is layered and
cleaned, the individual can reintroduce the money into the country
with more stringent regulations where the cleaned money can then
be used to fund additional criminal activities. While the country
with loose anti-money laundering standards benefits from the
transaction costs associated with the initial placement, the country
with more stringent standards bears the social cost incurred from
increased crime. In other words, Country B produced an external-
ity (money to fuel crime), and did not bear the costs (future crime).
Other indications suggest that this hypothetical is a reality.
First, while money laundering itself is not "reprehensible, 61
money laundering derives from predicate criminal activities and
"spread[s] the detrimental consequences of these criminal activi-
ties to many parts of society." 62 These externalities range far be-
yond money for increased crime. For instance, money laundering
forces the demand for money to shift from one country to another,
causing "money aggregates" to become more uncertain and ulti-
mately resulting in increased exchange rates and interest rate vola-
tility.63  Furthermore, legitimate transactions involving interna-
tional investors are deterred because the legitimate investor seeks
to avoid the risk that he or she will be associated with money
laundering. 64 Finally, as money laundering increases, the amount
of laundered assets will likely be larger than annual cash flows
from laundering activities, thereby substantially elevating eco-
nomic destabilization risks and inefficient resource allocations.65
60 STESSENS, supra note 2, at 87 (claiming that "money launderers primarily look to juris-
dictions that allow them to invest their criminally derived proceeds safely and to recycle them,
even when this involves a lower rate of return").
61 Id. at 84-85 ("The impetuses for attempting to tackle money laundering operations are
numerous, but they all have in common that they view money laundering not as a reprehensible
activity in itself, but as part of a larger criminal activity which is harmful to society.").
62 Id. at 84.
63 Peter J. Quirk, Money Laundering: Muddying the Macroeconomy, at
http://www.worldbank.org/fandd/englishI0397/articles/0l1 10397.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004);
see also STESSENS, supra note 2, at 87 (asserting that "[v]olatility in exchange rates and interest
rates, and asset price 'bubbles' resulting form the disposition of 'illegal' money, may also be
counted among the possible externalities of money laundering").
(4 Quirk, supra note 63.
65 Id. (asserting that economic growth suffers because "the underlying criminal activity
redirects income from high savers to low savers, or from sound investments to risky, low-
quality investments"); see also STESSENS, supra note 2, at 86 (arguing that money laundering
results in misallocated resources because labor and capital are used in illegal and socially dis-
ruptive activities, and world capital tends to be less optimally invested than would be the case
absent money laundering).
[Vol. 54:4
U.S. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS
One study suggests that increased laundering coincided with sig-
nificant reductions in annual GDP growth rates from 1983 to
1990.66
The negative impact money laundering has on the financial
sector and the economy at large constitutes the "most powerful
impetus for devising" anti-money laundering strategies. 67 Because
laundering typically involves contact with third parties engaged in
legitimate business transactions, laundering can lead to corruption,
"and more generally a warped functioning of some institutions
such as banks." 68  These findings conclusively establish that the
circumstances surrounding money laundering defeat the first race-
to-the-bottom assumption that "pollution" remains in the jurisdic-
tion in which it is produced.
2. Jurisdictions Do Not "All Reason in the Same Way"
The diverse anti-money laundering regulations around the
world suggest that the second race-to-the-bottom assumption also
fails. Under the second race-to-the-bottom assumption, jurisdic-
tions must reason in the same way, or stated differently, they must
have the same preference for a certain activity. However, nations
around the world do not reason in the same way when it comes to
anti-money laundering regulations. 69 A race-to-the-bottom propo-
nent is hard-pressed to reconcile the strict and increasingly bur-
densome anti-money laundering regulations in the United States
and other countries with the idea that the nations around the world
reason in the same way. Some nations may value anonymity more
than the increased transparency other countries value in their fight
against money laundering. 70 In fact, money-laundering "pollution"
results from certain nations giving preferential treatment to reve-
nue generated from lax money-laundering regulations, while si-
multaneously passing the costs associated with increased money
6 Quirk, supra note 63; see also STESSENS, supra note 2, at 87 ("Taken together, the ex-
ternalities of money laundering are likely to impact the growth rate of the world economies.").
67 STESSENS, supra note 2, at 86.
68 Id.
69 See generally HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IM-
PROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 19 (1996) (attacking this assumption and asserting that juris-
dictions have different preferences for a variety of "economic and aesthetic reasons"); Eyal
Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 199 (1999) (de-
scribing the "major obstacle[s] to cooperation" that heterogeneous nations face); Matthew B.
Comstock, GATT and GATS: A Public Morals Attack on Money Laundering, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& BuS. 139, 147 (1994) (arguing that while the United States has some of the world's strictest
money-laundering standards, "capital follows the path of least resistance"); Susan Weerasinghe
& Juerg Kaempfer, American and Swiss Anti-Money-Laundering Laws in Light of September
11, 15 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 31 (2002) (comparing United States and Swiss banking laws).
70 See Daley, supra note 3, at 199 (describing bank secrecy laws in "haven" jurisdictions).
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laundering off to other nations. Absent the requisite uniform pref-
erences, "it is by no means clear that competition between jurisdic-
tions will lead to a lower level of [anti-money laundering regula-
tions].'
C. Policy Implications for "Externality-Based" Analysis
Based on the foregoing analysis, the money-laundering phe-
nomenon's characteristics convincingly defeat the main assump-
tions upon which the race-to-the-bottom theory is based. Thus, the
problems associated with competition between jurisdictions are
logically distinct from problems associated with interstate exter-
nalities. Recognizing this distinction, the solution to the external-
ity problem associated with money laundering must focus on the
appropriate cost allocation rather than improving defective market
competition.72 This section will discuss the manner in which those
who benefit from money laundering can be forced to internalize
the costs associated with money laundering.
In addition to the money launderers, who obviously benefit
from money laundering and thus should be subject to criminal
penalties, the commercial vehicles used to facilitate money laun-
dering transactions frequently benefit from such transactions
through accumulated transaction fees. Historically, this situation
pits politicians and legislators, who want to overemphasize the
money-laundering phenomenon and increase anti-money launder-
ing regulations imposed on commercial entities, against those
commercial entities who seek to underemphasize the money-
laundering phenomenon in an effort to minimize compliance
CoStS. 73 The presence of these commercial entities impacts the fo-
cus of regulatory schemes. Some commentators argue that regula-
tors should not focus on completely eliminating externalities be-
cause many externalities result from desirable economic activity;
instead, regulators should focus on forcing commercial entities to
internalize the externalities:
Even if all negative externalities are internalized and the pri-
vate cost of production equals its social cost, pollution will
71 BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 69, at 19 (applying this principle to environmental poli-
cies).
72 Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global En-
vironment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2146 (1995) ("Unless each nation internalizes the negative exter-
nalities generated by pollution, for example, each government will have too little incentive to
limit pollution.").
73 See id.; see also COASE, supra note 1, at 119 (suggesting that "economists, and policy-
makers generally, have tended to over-estimate the advantages which come from governmental
regulation").
[Vol. 54:4
U.S. ANTI-MONEY LA UNDERING REGULATIONS
still not be eliminated. Instead, the result of internalization
will be that those causing pollution will be required to pay
the full social costs associated with their activities.74
Conceivably, if regulators force firms to completely eliminate
money-laundering risks, compliance costs may increase so much
that firms cease operations. This leads to the first premise upon
which appropriate anti-money laundering regulations should be
based: While those commercial entities that benefit from money-
laundering transactions should be forced to internalize money-
laundering costs, compliance costs should not be so high that
commercial entities are forced to cease operations.
Second, nations maintaining loose standards also benefit from
increased tax revenues and wages that money-laundering transac-
tions generate. Commentators often cite binding multijurisdic-
tional agreements as appropriate remedies for situations in which
one jurisdiction benefits at another jurisdiction's expense.75 How-
ever, it is important to note that this scenario does not presuppose
a "specific type of regulatory response., 76 Rather than giving mul-
tijurisdictional bodies the discretion to impose generic standards
on nations, the United States should force noncompliant nations
and their decision makers to bear the full costs associated with
their lax anti-money laundering standards. 77 This leads to the sec-
ond premise of anti-money laundering regulations: Unilateral ac-
tion may be preferable to international agreements because inter-
national agreements are often difficult to negotiate and expensive
to implement and monitor.78
74 BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 69, at 7.
75 Id. at 17 (describing the argument for federal regulation when states with pollution
sources do not account for all costs when formulating their environmental policies).
76 Id.
77 COASE, supra note 1, at 25 (arguing that "[i]f the costs of investigation and administra-
tion are sufficiently high and/or the results obtained are sufficiently uncertain, with the conse-
quence that the expected gains from governmental intervention are less than the costs involved"
then intervention is not warranted); see also BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 69, at 17 (suggest-
ing that "the interstate-externalities problem can be addressed by reallocating environmental
authority in a manner that would force states and state decision makers to bear the full costs of
their decisions regarding the regulation of pollution"); Doyle, supra note 5, at 282 (suggesting
that nations with lax money laundering standards should face "the costs of risks associated with
illegal transactions").
78 See Comstock, supra note 69, at 152 (arguing that "no agreement will entice unscrupu-
lous nations to comply with money laundering agreements").
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III. UNITED STATES ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY:
FORCING COST-INTERNALIZATION THROUGH STRONG DOMESTIC
REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEVERAGE
As described above, three groups benefit from money launder-
ing: the launderers; the facilities earning transaction fees for inten-
tionally or unintentionally laundering funds; and the nations that
attract capital and the associated benefits thereof, through offering
lax anti-money laundering regulations. Consequently, the United
States should focus its efforts on developing and monitoring an
anti-money laundering regulatory scheme that shifts the costs the
United States is forced to bear from money-laundering activities
onto the three groups that benefit the most from money laundering.
This section will discuss the manner in which current U.S. anti-
money laundering efforts impose costs upon these beneficiaries.
A. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970: Allocating Costs to
Potential Laundering Vehicles
Through the reporting requirements set forth in, and promul-
gated under, the Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA"),7 9 the United States
minimizes the risk that commercial institutions might be used as
money laundering vehicles. These reporting requirements consti-
tute an effort to force those who might facilitate the transactions,
and thereby benefit from fees associated with those transactions, to
share in the costs resulting from money laundering. The BSA, the
first legislative act focused on curtailing money laundering, grants
the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to develop and imple-
ment various record-keeping and reporting requirements that fi-
nancial institutions must follow.80 The BSA's stated purpose is to
"require certain reports or records where they have a high degree
of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or pro-
ceedings.,81  The BSA establishes reporting and record-keeping
requirements for all foreign and domestic currency transactions
over $10,000,82 and sets forth civil and criminal penalties for non-
compliance. 83  The philosophy underlying the reporting and re-
79 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5326 (2002).
80 Id. § 5313(a) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to establish anti-money laun-
dering regulations, and charging the Treasury Department with overseeing compliance with the
reporting requirements); see also Daley, supra note 3, at 189 (noting the United States "had
attempted to address the use of domestic banks in the money laundering process with the pas-
sage of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, which provided the foundation upon which future U.S.
anti-money laundering legislation was built").
81 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2002).
82 See id. § 5313.
83 See id. §§ 5321-5322.
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cord-keeping requirements was the creation of a paper trail that
could lead investigators from the laundered money to the criminal
activity that originally generated the funds. 84
Money launderers quickly learned to circumvent the BSA's
requirements. First, in order to avoid bank detection, money laun-
derers broke transactions greater than $10,000 into segments less
than $10,000, thereby avoiding the BSA's reporting requirements
through a process known as "smurfing. '' 85 Additionally, since the
BSA was limited to "specified financial institutions," money laun-
derers worked through non-bank currency exchanges and other
exempt financial service providers often in amounts greater than
$10,000.86
Eventually, criminals began using wire transfer systems,
which were unregulated until 1995, for international money laun-
dering purposes. 87  This "internationalization of money launder-
ing" significantly increased the "difficulty and cost of following
the paper trail of illegitimate money., 88 Consequently, in 1995,
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN")89 and the
Federal Reserve Board amended the BSA regulations in an effort
to improve the use of wire transfer systems to trace money laun-
dering. 90  Under the new regulations, financial institutions 91 per-
forming wire transfers must maintain certain records92 regarding
payment orders for a period of five years.
93
84 Rueda, supra note 19, at 146 (quoting Money Laundering and the Drug Trade: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on the Crime of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., at sec.
II.1 (1997) (statement of Michael F. Zeldin, Principal, Price Waterhouse)); see also Doyle,
supra note 5, at 287 (stating the intent underlying the BSA was to "enabl[e] government en-
forcement agencies to track down lucrative and illicit criminal enterprises").
85 Daley, supra note 3, at 189; see also Rueda, supra note 19, at 148 (describing "smurf-
ing" as the practice of splitting the total amount available for deposit into amounts below the
$10,000 threshold).
86 Daley, supra note 3, at 189-90.
87 Lisa A. Barbot, Comment, Money Laundering: An International Challenge, 3 TuL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 193 (1995) (arguing that increased use of wire transfers resulted in ele-
vated levels of international money laundering).
88 Christopher D. Hoffman, Note, Encrypted Digital Cash Transfers: Why Traditional
Money Laundering Controls May Fail Without Uniform Cryptography Regulations, 21 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 799,842 (1998).
89 FinCEN is a division within the United States Department of Treasury charged with en-
forcing anti-money laundering regulation. See generally www.fincen.gov.
90 See Amendment to the Bank Security Act Regulations Relating to Recordkeeping for
Funds Transfers and Transmittals of Funds by Financial Institutions, 58 Fed. Reg. 46,014-15
(proposed Aug. 31, 1993) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (establishing the new regulation
in an attempt to prevent the use of wire transfers for money laundering purposes).
91 Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Transactions, 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.11 (n) (2003) (defining "financial institution"); see also 31 C.F.R. § 103.11 (q) (defining
"funds transfer").
92 Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Recordkeeping for Funds
Transfers and Transmittals of Funds by Financial Institutions, 60 Fed. Reg. 220, 229-31 (Jan. 3,
1995) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (establishing reporting requirements for transfers of
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In addition to traditional banks, the category "financial insti-
tutions" also includes non-bank institutions that, under the BSA,
are assigned to the category "money services businesses"
("MSBs"). 94  Money transmitters, check cashers, currency ex-
changes, and issuers, sellers, and redeemers of traveler's checks,
money orders, and stored value are each considered MSBs. 95 In
1999, FinCEN broadly construed the manner in which BSA regula-
tions applied to "money transmitters. 96 The new definition in-
cluded as a "money transmitter":
Any person, whether or not licensed or required to be li-
censed, who engages as a business in accepting currency, or
funds denominated in currency, and transmits the currency or
funds, or the value of the currency or funds, by any means
through a financial agency or institution, a Federal Reserve
Bank or other facility of one or more Federal Reserve Banks,
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or
both, or an electronic funds transfer network; or ... (a]ny
other person engaged as a business in the transfer of funds.97
Additionally, in 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act ("Patriot Act")98
extended the definition for "money transmitter" to include "any
person who engages as a business in an informal money transfer
system or any network of people who engage as a business in fa-
cilitating the transfer of money." 99 The Patriot Act extended the
definition for "financial institutions" to include foreign banks, and
gave U.S. district courts jurisdiction over certain foreign moneylaunderers.l°°
In conclusion, the BSA's broadening scope brings vast num-
bers of institutions within the BSA's coverage. This broad appli-
cation imposes stringent maintenance and compliance costs on the
U.S. $3,000 or more).
93 Id. at 228 (defining "payment order").
- 31 C.F.R. § 103.1 l(uu) (defining "money service business").
95 Id.
96 U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC-
TION 359 OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS
REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001 6 (2002) [hereinafter A
REPORT TO CONGRESS], available at http://www.fincen.gov/Pub_fjincen-reports.html.
- 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5).
98 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001).
99 Id. § 359(a), 115 Stat. at 328.
1001d. § 377, 115 Stat. at 342 (extending 18 U.S.C. § 1029 to conduct committed abroad,
so long as the tools or proceeds of the crimes pass through or are in the United States); see also
Weerasinghe & Kaempfer, supra note 69, at 32 (pointing out that a "sufficient nexus to the
United States" must exist in order for jurisdiction to kick in).
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institutions falling under the BSA. In fact, some institutions are
beginning to complain about the hassles and expenses they face
when trying to comply with these regulations.' 0 Consequently,
these institutions are clearly being forced to internalize the costs
associated with money laundering.
B. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986:
Shifting Costs to the Launderers
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 ("MLCA")10 2
was the first regulatory scheme to criminalize money laundering
and knowingly assisting in criminal money-laundering acts.1
0 3
Additionally, the MLCA criminalized "willingly accept[ing]
money that are the fruits of illegal activity, or to structure transac-
tions for the purpose of avoiding the reporting requirements.'
Furthermore, the MLCA contains civil and criminal forfeitures for
"money launderers and the financial institutions they utilize."' 5
As a result, the MLCA represents an effort to force money laun-
derers to bear the costs associated with their activities.
The MLCA contains two sections. Section 1956 pertains to
those financial transactions involving the proceeds of any "speci-
fied unlawful activity.' 0 6  Under § 1956(a)(1), an individual is
guilty of money laundering when she conducts a financial transac-
tion involving dirty money (i.e., proceeds from a "specified unlaw-
ful activity") with the intent of promoting a specified unlawful ac-
tivity,1°7 concealing the dirty money's origin, °8 or avoiding a re-
porting requirement.' °9 An individual violates § 1956(a)(2), and is
thereby guilty of money laundering, if he carries out any of these
three offenses by transmitting, transferring, or transporting a
monetary instrument or funds outside the United States.' 0
Section 1957 contemplates a "monetary transaction" in prop-
erty derived from specified unlawful activities."' A "monetary
101 See infra Part I.B.
102 Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352(a), 100 Stat. 3207-18 to -21 (1986) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (2000)).
103 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000).
104 Id.
105 Daley, supra note 3, at 190.
106See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a). The phrase "specified unlawful activities" is used in both
§ 1956 and § 1957. "Specified unlawful activities" was expanded in scope from covering tradi-
tional organized crime conduct ranging from drug trafficking, RICO predicates, murder, kid-
napping, espionage, and Food Stamp Act violations, to terrorist conduct. Id. § 1956(c)(7).
107 d. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
1081d. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
109 Id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).
"ld. § 1956(a)(2).
" Id. § 1957(a).
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transaction" is any transaction, such as a deposit, withdrawal,
transfer, or exchange of funds or a monetary instrument, carried
out through a financial institution.1 12 Section 1957 does not re-
quire the government to prove a defendant knew that the underly-
ing offense from which the dirty money originated was a specified
unlawful activity. 113 Consequently, an individual cannot circum-
vent money-laundering liability through willful blindness.11 4
While the predicate offenses contained in the MLCA are not pun-
ishable under the statute, they are a "precondition to the statute's
applicability."'" 5 Like the BSA, the MLCA sets forth both crimi-
nal and civil penalties. Criminal penalties include imprisonment
for up to twenty years, and fines amounting to the larger of
$500,000 or twice the amount laundered. 16 Civil penalties include
fines no greater than $10,000 and forfeiture.' 7
C. International Efforts Towards Allocating Costs to Nations
with Lax Standards and the Money Launderers Therein
The United States uses economic coercion to force nations
with loose anti-money laundering standards to internalize the so-
cial costs resulting from money laundering. The U.S. uses its
dominant position as a global financial leader to compel assimila-
tion to adequate anti-money laundering regulation by threatening
to "cut off access to the U.S. financial system" unless uncoopera-
tive nations comply with stringent banking standards. 1 8 Further-
more, the United States, historically, has successfully conditioned
financial aid and tariff concession with Caribbean territories on
cooperation in improving anti-money laundering regulations. 19 It
is also important to note that the United States belongs to the Fi-
nancial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, a large multina-
tional organization charged with developing international anti-
money laundering standards.
1121d. § 1957(0(1).
113 Id. § 1957(c).
1141d. § 1957.
15 Rueda, supra note 19, at 149.
116 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2).
17 id. § 1956(b)(1).
118 Eric Helleiner, THE ILUCrr GLOBAL ECONOMY AND STATE POWER 53, 72 (H. Richard
Friman & Peter Andreas eds., 1999).
19 Id. at 73. But see Doyle, supra note 5, at 290 (arguing that these moves "undermine the
stability of the financial markets they purport to stabilize by introducing political unrest, local
distrust of bank managers and regulators and legal uncertainties").
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IV. THE USA PATRIOT ACT: ALLOCATING COSTS
IN THE CYBERLAUNDERING ERA
"Unlawful activity is not unique to the Internet-but the
Internet has a way of magnifying both the good and the
bad in our society... [Wihat we need to do is find new
answers to old crimes."
--Al Gore, Vice President of the United States of America
August 5, 1999120
The manner in which current anti-money laundering regula-
tions apply to new technology, and in particular, electronic pay-
ment systems, and how effective these regulations will be are mat-
ters up for debate. The United States successfully uses its strin-
gent and comprehensive anti-money laundering regulations to "in-
sulate its banking sector from large-scale exploitation by money
launderers. ' 22 While evidence shows the September 11 th terror-
ists made extensive use of email and the Internet in carrying out
their operation, which cost an estimated $500,000, t22 some critics
argue that the Patriot Act fails to clearly address email and other
emerging technologies such as cyberbanking and Internet payment
systems. 123 This section takes the opposite position. After briefly
introducing the cyberlaundering risks that new Internet-based
payment systems present, this section will argue that the recently
enacted Patriot Act appropriately enhances the United States' anti-
money laundering regulations and brings Internet-based payments
systems and other informal value transfer systems within the regu-
latory framework.
A. Cyberspace: Money Laundering's Future Medium
Cyberlaundering occurs when individuals use the Internet and
associated technologies to transform criminal proceeds into clean
funds that are untraceable.124 Speed, 125 anonymity, 126 and the abil-
12°U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL
CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET, A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET (2000) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
unlawful.htm (last modified Aug. 6, 2003).
121 Rueda, supra note 19, at 143.
122 Michael T. McCarthy, Recent Development, USA PATRIOTAct, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
435,438 (2002).
123See Reuda, supra note 19, at 142 (noting that "[n]ew technology, once more widely
available, such as electronic money, will facilitate the transfer of enormous amounts of funds
across national boundaries with little interference by domestic authorities").
124 Sarah N. Welling & Andy G. Rickman, Cyberlaundering: The Risks, the Responses, 50
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ity to transfer unlimited value 27 make electronic value transfer
systems attractive vehicles for money laundering. Cryptography
makes tracing the numerous electronic money transfers that take
place during the layering and placement stages virtually impossi-
ble.128 These factors make cyberlaundering a unique challenge for
regulators. 1
29
Electronic money ("e-money") is the currency used in Inter-
net-based commercial transactions, and represents "tokens of
monetary value that take digital form."1 30  The Internet is particu-
larly attractive to businesses and consumers alike because the
Internet facilitates virtually instantaneous value transfers while
substantially decreasing transaction costs inherent in hard cur-
rency-based relationships.' 31 While early e-money prototypes like
CyberCash and the Mondex electronic purse card were not com-
mercially successful, American Express, Visa U.S.A., and Visa
FLA. L. REV. 295, 310 (1998).
i5 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, 1996-1997 REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING TY-
POLOGIES 26 (1997) ("The rapid movement of e-money ... will make it difficult for law en-
forcement to identify or track these fund transfers.") [hereinafter FATF REPORT], available at
http:llwww.fincen.gov/fatf.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
126 Id. at 19 ("Electronic money (e-money) has the potential to make it easier for criminals
to hide the source of their proceeds and move those proceeds without detection."); see also
Sheila C. Bair, Following the Money and Seizing the Assets: Comments at the Seventh Annual
Institute on the Emerging Law of Cyberbanking and Electronic Commerce (Feb. 7, 2002)
("Challenging issues to be confronted will include: how to identify clients who may only engage
in Interet transactions for which no physical face-to-face meeting is ever necessary."), avail-
able at http://www.treas.gov/presslreleaseslpo989.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
127 See Wendy J. Weimer, Cyberlaundering: An International Cache for Microchip Money,
13 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 199, 221 (2001) ("The cyberstream provides the perfect instrumentality to
launder this money due to the speed of the transaction, its security by means of anonymity, and
the unlimited amount that can be transferred.").
128 William R. Spernow, Cybercrooks on the Net: Why Traditional Law Enforcement Will
Be Unable to Cope with Threats to the Electronic Commerce System, in 1 MONEY LAUNDER-
ING, ASSET FORFEITURE AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRIMES 14 (Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr.
& Robert J. Munro, eds., 1997) ("Unbreakable encryption is the primary factor that puts Cyber-
Crooks at an advantage over law enforcement ... [Clurrent CyberCops agree and predict that
there will be a substantial increase in cases where [they] were able to avoid prosecution because
evidence that would have convicted them is encrypted and therefore unexaminable."); see also
Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63
TENN. L. REV. 143, 195 (1995) (asserting that as cryptography technology is improved, crimi-
nals will be able to expand their money laundering capabilities).
129 Hoffman, supra note 88, at 842 (1998) (discussing how criminals quietly found ways to
evade the requirements of the BSA).
130 Shahriar Tavakol, Digital Value Units, Electronic Commerce and International Trade:
An Obituary for State Sovereignty over National Markets, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 1197, 1199 & 1204 (1999); see also Julia Alpert Gladstone, Exploring the Role of
Digital Currency in the Retail Payment System, 31 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1193, 1196-97 (1997)
(commenting that e-money cannot be considered legal tender in the United States absent a Con-
gressional act).
'3' Welling & Rickman, supra note 124, at 299-300; see also Jonathan P. Straub, The Pre-
vention of E-Money Laundering: Tracking the Elusive Audit Trail, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 515, 516 (2002) (noting e-money is a "byproduct of... consumer demand for transac-
tional efficiency").
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International are developing various cards containing computer
chips that can store information and offer payment capabilities
with various security features. 32  Additionally, Internet payment
systems and other electronic payment systems, like PayPal, are
growing in popularity and, as such, they will likely be used to fa-
cilitate widespread money laundering transactions in the future. 133
Over the past few years, regulators around the world have
started focusing on cyberlaundering threats. "[Liegal authorities
around the world look on with increasing anxiety as technological
innovations drive the development of payment systems that
threaten to emasculate current money laundering safeguards."'' 34
In fact, the Financial Action Task Force, established at the July
1989 G-7 Summit in Paris and charged with exploring anti-money
laundering measures, listed several concerns in its 1996-1997 An-
nual Report, including:
(a) the need to review and potentially revise existing regula-
tory regimes to ensure adequate supervision of all types of e-
money providers; (b) whether accurate and adequate records
of transactions and persons involved will be available; (c)
stored value cards may be more difficult to detect than physi-
cal currency; and (d) the speed and volume of e-money trans-
actions may make it more difficult to track or identify un-
usual patterns of financial transactions.
1 35
Others have expressed concerns about current anti-money launder-
ing regulatory schemes' ability to address, and prevent, money
laundering through digital payment systems. 36  In fact, the U.S.
Department of Treasury is conducting a study on the ways in
132 Andres Rueda, The Implications of Strong Encryption Technology on Money Launder-
ing, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 1, 36 (2001) (suggesting that, while the "technology necessary to
implement online payment systems is already available," the market success has been limited);
see also U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, A SURVEY OF ELEC-
TRONIC CASH, ELECTRONIC BANKING, AND INTERNET GAMBLING 11-20 (2000) (describing
various forms of electronic currency and electronic payment systems), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/e-cash.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
133 See Weimer, supra note 127, at 200 (arguing that the Internet will be the "predominant
source of online banking by year 2020").
134 Hoffman, supra note 88, at 844; see also Weimer, supra note 127, at 201 ("The method
of physically commingling funds from legitimate and illegal activities to lose the indicia of their
origins is no longer a necessity due to the unregulated, anonymous, innovative banking conduit,
the Internet.").
135 FATF REPORT, supra note 125, at 15.
136 Rueda, supra note 19, at 143 (arguing "law enforcement is constantly playing a game of
catch-up" because the current anti-money laundering regulatory system is "static" and "does not
allow for a tailored law enforcement approach responsive to the latest money-laundering gim-
mick"); see also Tavakol, supra note 130, at 1199 (expressing general skepticism about the
regulation of online electronic trade).
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which terrorists might use the Internet to move funds without de-
tection. 137
B. Allocating Costs in Cyberspace
United States anti-money laundering regulations provide the
appropriate tools to address cyberlaundering. As shown earlier,
the proper anti-money laundering regulatory scheme must allocate
costs to those parties benefiting the most from money launder-
ing. 138  Additionally, the appropriate regulatory scheme should not
force compliance costs so high that commercial entities are forced
to cease operations. Regulating money laundering in cyberspace
presents additional concerns. First, the "Internet, like most new
technologies, is an inherently value-neutral tool: It can be used in
ways that are socially beneficial or socially harmful." 139 As such,
because the Internet has "enormous potential economic and social
benefits," anti-money laundering regulation should protect against
new criminal methods "without unintentionally stifling its
growth."' 4 Second, technology-specific regulation may be based
upon assumptions that do not exist in the current circumstances.'
41
Implementing technology-specific laws will force legislators to
constantly revisit regulations to make sure the regulations are
technologically updated. This will add significant monitoring
costs and could encourage money launderers to develop and use
new technologies for money laundering. 42  Finally, technology-
specific laws may solidify a certain technology's use in the indus-
try and prevent or hinder new, and perhaps economically and so-
cially beneficial, technological developments.143 The Patriot Act'
44
137 U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 2002 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 24 (July
2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/monlaund.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2004).
138 See supra Part II.
139 U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Electronic Frontier, supra note 120.
140Id.
141 Id. (suggesting that regulations pertaining to "wire communications" may not have con-
templated, and consequently may not apply to, wireless or satellite communications).
142 Id. ("Regulation tied to a particular technology may quickly become obsolete and re-
quire further amendment."); see also Mark D. Schopper, Internet Gambling, Electronic Cash &
Money Laundering: The Unintended Consequences of a Monetary Control Scheme, 5 CHAP. L.
REv. 303, 326 (2002) (warning that "Congress should be very careful ... not to encourage an
anonymous form of e-money before it is prepared to deal with the consequences," and that
Congressional over-regulation will "encourage" the development of new money-laundering
technologies); Weimer, supra note 127, at 220 (suggesting that cyberlaundering's escalating
popularity results from a strong finance and banking industry's strict adherence to tight federal
anti-money laundering regulations).
143 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 120 ("Technology-
specific laws and regulations may also 'lock-in' a particular technology, hindering the develop-
ment of superior technology.").
1'4 Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act entitled "International Money Laundering Abate-
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satisfies these concerns while facilitating the spread of cyberlaun-
dering costs across the appropriate actors through regulation,
criminal sanctions and forfeiture, and international cooperation.
45
1. Costs Spread over New Service Providers
With the Patriot Act's addition, United States anti-money
laundering regulations continue to address cyberlaundering
through cost allocations in two ways. First, the Patriot Act ex-
pands the BSA's scope to include informal value transfer sys-
tems.146 The Patriot Act expands the definition of "financial insti-
tutions" and "money services businesses" in a way that captures
emerging technology providers.1 47 In particular, section 359(a) of
the Patriot Act brings "informal money transfer systems" under the
BSA's reporting requirements.148  In November 2002, the United
States Treasury Department concluded that Internet-based vehicles
such as PayPal and other electronic payment systems constituted
types of "informal value transfer systems.' 49  Second, it is impor-
tant to realize that value transferred via the Internet must enter cy-
berspace through a real world-cyberspace transaction. As a result,
if an Internet payment system or other electronic payment system
misses a suspicious transaction, or the reporting requirements are
not triggered, the "real world" participant's reporting requirements
will most likely be triggered because the Patriot Act extends re-
ment and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001," 115 Stat. at 296-342, specifically addresses
money laundering.
145 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 9, at CRS-24; see also 147 CONG. REc. H7159
(daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001) (recognizing that "outmoded and inadequate statutory provisions"
impede U.S. anti-money laundering efforts, especially when such laundering involves "foreign
persons, foreign banks, or foreign countries").
146 See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2000) (including in the definition of "financial institution"
to include, among others, "(R) a licensed sender of money or other person who engages as a
business in the transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a business in an
informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitat-
ing the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of conventional financial insti-
tutions system"); see also Rueda, supra note 19, at 149 (arguing that the Patriot Act widens the
BSA's scope "to levels unseen in money laundering legislation anywhere in the world").
1
47 Rueda, supra note 19, at 149; see also U.S. May Extend Curbs on Laundering, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 20, 2003, at B8 (discussing the U.S. Department of Treasury's plans to extend anti-
money laundering regulations to dealers in precious stones, dealers in precious metals, travel
agents, and dealers in cars, trucks, and/or boats).
148 A REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 96, at 6.
149 Id. at 6-7 (arguing that § 359(a) of the Patriot Act makes it "clear that under U.S. law all
money transfer remitters, including those that operate on an informal basis, or outside the scope
of the conventional financial sector, are subject to the BSA"); see also id. at 19 (including in the
"range" of informal value transfer systems such mechanisms as "stored value transfers" and
"internet-based payment systems"). Interestingly, the Department of Treasury appears to use
the terms "money" and "value" interchangeably, which suggests the Treasury is looking to
function over form. Id. at 6.
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porting requirements and "know your customer" standards beyond
traditional financial institutions.
150
As suggested earlier, over-regulation is a concern. This con-
cern is mitigated somewhat because legitimate businesses tend to
value the security the Unites States regulatory system provides, as
a whole; consequently, businesses are less cost-sensitive when it
comes to increased regulation. On the other hand, recent devel-
opments suggest that regulators are approaching the threshold. In
late 2002, the Treasury Department backed off information-sharing
requirements it promulgated earlier in the year because bankers
complained that the regulations were too burdensome.15 This
situation highlights an important distinction: implementation prob-
lems and structural defects in the regulations are different issues.
In conclusion, while the implementation procedures present chal-
lenges between balancing the government's interest to money
laundering information and businesses' interest in minimizing
compliance costs, the regulatory framework itself provides an ap-
propriate cost-allocation system to combat cyberlaundering.1
5 2
2. Costs Allocated to Would-be Money Launderers
The Patriot Act treats on-line money laundering the same way
traditional off-line money laundering is treated. After the Patriot
Act, cyberlaunders will be subjected to the same criminal punish-
ments and forfeiture procedures to which money launderers using
traditional means are subjected because § 359(a) of the Patriot Act
also expanded the money-laundering methodologies covered under
the MLCA to include Internet technologies. 53  This treatment
represents a technology-neutral standard that should not inadver-
15 ld. at 22 (asserting that since informal value transfer systems must "interface with the
formal banking sector when they make deposits, [and] engage in wire or other transfers," regu-
lations applicable to the traditional banking sector will assist in detecting money laundering).
See generally U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SECTION 356(c) OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE
TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001 (2002) (discussing
the manner in which the Act applies to various investment companies), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/365repot.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
151 See Rob Garver, Hearing Complaints, Treasury Suspends Data-Request Rule, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 21, 2002, at 4 (explaining how the compliance requests from the Treasury De-
partment in conjunction with the requirements set forth in the Patriot Act are overwhelming
bankers).
152See A REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 96, at 10 (arguing that money laundering
problems "do not arise from lack of pertinent statutory or regulatory tools"); see also Paul
Beckett & Carrick Mollenkamp, Western Union Nipped by Patriot Act, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20,
2002, at A3 (alleging this was the first time the Patriot Act was used against a "major financial
firm").
153 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000) (adopting the definition of "financial institution" set forth
in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(b)(2) (2000)).
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tently encourage would-be money launderers to develop new tech-
nologies in their effort to avoid detection. Additionally, the Patriot
Act expands the United States district courts' jurisdiction to
money launderers in foreign countries.154  As a result, under the
Patriot Act, the barriers to money laundering have increased along
with the costs would-be money launderers must bear.
3. Influence over International Jurisdictions
Finally, the U.S. should continue to wield its economic influ-
ence over those jurisdictions with lax standards that operate money
laundering safe havens. While this Note by no means suggests that
the U.S. should abandon international efforts to influence compli-
ance, this Note recognizes the limitations on international consen-
sus building. 55  Instead, the United States should constantly re-
evaluate its role in these ventures, preferring unilateral action over
resource-consuming international consensus building. Most re-
sources should be placed on economic coercion. 156 Some authors
argue that these methods constitute economic bullying. 157 On the
other hand, and perhaps more damaging, the hold-up potential that
exists when attempting to build international consensus, and the
risk that signatory nations will shirk on agreements, will enable
those jurisdictions who already export money laundering costs to
the U.S. to extract additional costs. 58 Furthermore, wielding eco-
nomic influence does not always entail cutting off funding or im-
plementing refusals to deal. It may be beneficial to offer noncom-
pliant nations financial and trade incentives for compliance, rather
than restrictions for noncompliance. 59 This Note should not be
construed as advocating that the United States completely abandon
international efforts to fight money laundering. Instead, this Note
is simply arguing that the United States should focus its primary
effort on unilateral incentives rather than incur additional costs in
complete reliance on international cooperation.
5 USA PATRIOT Act, Title HI, § 377, 115 Stat. 342 (2001).
155See supra Part H; see also Comstock, supra note 69, at 162 (arguing that cooperative
agreements create "an incentive for some nations to cheat").
156 Comstock, supra note 69, at 166, 168 (proposing that the United States use tariffs to in-
duce cooperation and to "penalize those nations which profit from money laundering... [and]
ensure that profits from money laundering are more than offset by the decrease in international
trade").
157 See Doyle, supra note 5, at 281.
158 See generally Bruce Zagaris & Elizabeth Kingma, Asset Forfeiture International &
Foreign Law: An Emerging Regime, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 445, 487 (1991) (discussing re-
fusal and postponement of cooperation in multinational agreements).
159 See Chang, supra note 72, at 2149 (arguing that "[w]hen cooperation is not forthcom-
ing, positive incentives are the best way to achieve sustained inter-governmental cooperation").
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CONCLUSION
Nations with permissive money laundering regulations create
social costs. These social costs do not result from defective mar-
ket competition; instead, the social costs result from the producing
nation's failure to recognize these costs when setting policy. This
observation holds significant policy implications for money laun-
dering regulators in the United States. Based on this observation,
this Note suggests ways to address cyberlaundering. More impor-
tantly, however, this Note indicates what the economic approach to
the cyberlaundering problem should be. SHAWN TURNERt
t J.D. Candidate, 2004, Case Western Reserve School of Law; M.B.A. Candidate, 2004,
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